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Determined to Feel Free: The Psychological Reality of 
Moral Responsibility 
 
Sara Gottlieb 
 
“My first act of free will shall be to believe in free will” 
- William James 
 
I. Introduction  
 Among introductory topics in philosophy, the 
problem of free will is arguably far more troubling to the 
ordinary student than many other issues. Free will and 
conscious control, for one, affects every single individual – 
there is no sense in which we can rise above concerns 
regarding the autonomous control of our actions. And 
second, the issue of free will is inextricably linked to 
concerns of moral responsibility. Our fear of determinism is 
a gaping existential anxiety that deep down we, as humans, 
are not in control of our own choices. So all the deliberation 
we perform in order to pick the correct decision is pointless, 
it would seem, because everything has already been 
preordained by the state of our brains. Steven Pinker 
describes the consequences of relinquishing the feeling of 
conscious deliberation: 
If you suffer from this anxiety, I suggest the 
following experiment. For the next few days, 
don’t bother deliberating over your actions. 
It’s a waste of time, after all; they have 
already been determined…No, I am not 
seriously suggesting you try this! But a 
moment’s decisions should serve as a Valium 
for the existential anxiety. The experience of 
choosing is not a fiction, regardless of how  
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the brain works…You cannot step outside it 
or let it go on without you because it is you. 
If the most ironclad form of determinism is 
real, you could not do anything about it 
anyway, because your anxiety about 
determinism, and how you would deal with it, 
would also be determined. It is the existential 
fear of determinism that is the real waste of 
time (Pinker 2008, 312). 
 
 Simply put, we blame people for an evil act or bad 
decision only when they intend the consequences and could 
have done otherwise. After all, we usually put less blame on 
the hunter who shot his friend thinking he was a deer than 
one who murders intentionally. We tend to show mercy to 
the victim of torture who betrays a comrade and a delirious 
patient who lashes out at family members because we feel 
they are not in command of their faculties. Again, we do not 
put small children on trial if they incidentally cause a death, 
nor do we try inanimate objects and non-human animals in 
the court of law – we consider them to be constitutionally 
incapable of making an informed choice.  
 Free will and moral responsibility reads as a classic 
paradox, based on the following set of inconsistent claims: 
1. Every action is caused. 
2. If an act is caused, then it is determined. 
3. If an act is determined, then it is not done by 
free will. 
4. If an act is not done by free will, then its 
agent is not fully morally responsible for that 
act. 
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5. If an agent is not fully  
morally responsible for that act, then that 
agent should not be punished for the act. 
6. Yet some agents should be punished for 
particular acts. 
The debate over these claims emerges as a clash primarily 
between compatibilists and incompatibilists. This 
disagreement relies mostly upon claims 3-4. Incompatibilists 
assert that if an act is completely determined, then the agent 
is not fully morally responsible for that act. Compatibilists, 
on the other hand, deny this assertion in favor of preserving 
some degree of responsibility even when acts are 
determined. 
 The worry of free will comes under scrutiny in light 
of the scientific image. Owen Flanagan, in his book The 
Problem of the Soul, attempts to reconcile the manifest 
image with the scientific image of the mind. His portrayal of 
the problem of free will as elucidated by the scientific image 
will be the focus from here on out: 
Suppose I accept that everything that happens 
has a set of causes sufficient to produce it. 
Given this set of causes, whatever they are, 
this effect, whatever it is, is necessary. 
Suppose I also accept that when I act I do so 
for reasons, often after I think and deliberate. 
Such acts are free. But when I act freely, we 
can ask, why did I think, deliberate, and 
reason in the way I did rather than in some 
other way? […] There is no denying that I 
reason, think, and deliberate; what is denied 
is that my reasoning, thinking, and 
deliberating are self-originating, things that  
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cause my actions without themselves having  
            causes that make them necessary. If,         
however, I think of my action in terms of the 
wider causal nexus, as falling under the law 
of universal causal determinism, then I can’t 
conceive of my action as having been 
different than it was (Flanagan 2002, 45).  
 
 As Pinker explains, people hoping that an uncaused 
soul might rescue a sense of personal responsibility from the 
deterministic natural sciences, mind sciences, and 
evolutionary psychology, are in for disappointment. Daniel 
Dennett, after all, points out that the last thing we want in a 
soul is freedom to do anything that it desires (Dennett 1984). 
If behavior were driven by an utterly free (in all sense of the 
term) will, then we really could not hold people responsible 
for their actions since an individual would not be deterred by 
the threat of punishment or feelings of guilt. In short, a 
completely free agent, floating on a different plane from the 
powers of cause and effect, would be unaffected by moral 
codes of law and ethics and not have any reason to act since 
its will would be completely unrestrained (Pinker 2008).  
 This paper argues for a naturalist account of the 
problem of free will. I will focus on the feeling of being a 
morally responsible agent, not the ontological truth-value or 
whether or not human beings are actual morally responsible 
agents. Again, this focus on the feeling is a second-order 
question that does not claim to answer the first-order 
problem of whether any of the terms to which I will refer – 
compatibilism, incompatibilism, free will, determinism, 
etcetera - are true in their strict logical sense. I aim to show 
that the feeling of being a morally free and responsible agent  
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is a facet of human cognition that is not readily undermined 
by contradictory knowledge of a naturalistic universe. My 
naturalized account is similar to that of Hume’s skeptical  
approach to the problem of induction, and appeals to 
evidence from both psychology and experimental 
philosophy. I call special attention to affective emotional 
states, providing evidence for the profound influence of 
emotion on moral decision-making, and the divide between 
abstract (i.e., philosophically guided) and concrete (i.e., 
emotionally laden) intuitions.  
 
II. Does knowledge of a naturalistically determined 
universe lead to immoral behavior? 
 Pinker espoused an anecdotal account of why we 
should fear determinism, but social psychologists have 
approached the issue from an empirical perspective. In a 
recent investigation, Kathleen Vohs and Jonathan Schooler 
asked whether moral behavior draws on a belief in free will. 
They examined whether inducing participants to believe that 
human behavior is predetermined would encourage cheating. 
Participants read one of two excerpts from Francis Crick’s 
The Astonishing Hypothesis; those in the experimental 
condition read about a fiercely deterministic and reductionist 
view of the brain: “You, your joys and your sorrows, your 
memories and your ambitions, your sense of personal 
identity and free will, are in fact no more than the behavior 
of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated 
molecules. Who you are is nothing but a pack of neurons.” 
The control group read an excerpt that discussed 
consciousness but did not mention free will. Participants 
then engaged in a seemingly unrelated task, and were told to 
take a particular amount of money as compensation for their 
participation after the experimenter had left the room.  
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However, more money was available so that the participants 
could cheat the system by taking more than instructed. They 
found that participants who read deterministic statements  
cheated by overpaying themselves for performance on a 
cognitive task – a type of immoral behavior. Thus, they 
suggest that the debate over free will has societal, as well as 
scientific and theoretical implications. The authors write: 
If exposure to deterministic messages 
increases the likelihood of unethical actions, 
then identifying approaches for insulating the 
public against this danger becomes 
imperative. Ultimately, in order to oppose the 
unfavorable consequences of deterministic 
sentiments, the field must first develop a 
deeper understanding of why dismissing free 
will leads to amoral behaviors. Does the 
belief that forces outside the self determine 
behavior drain the motivation to resist the 
temptation to cheat, inducing a ‘why bother’ 
mentality? Doubting one’s free will may 
undermine the sense of self as agent (Vohs 
and Schooler 2008, 54). 
 
 In a follow-up study by noted social psychologist 
Roy Baumeister, he and his colleagues sought to extend the 
results of Vohs and Schooler into a broader context, namely 
helping and aggression. They hypothesized that a disbelief 
in free will increases aggression and reduces helping since 
free will is crucial for motivating people to control their 
automatic impulses in favor of more prosocial types of 
behavior. Vohs and Schooler proposed that doubting free 
will serves as a subtle cue that exerting volition is futile and 
induces the “why bother” mentality. Thus, Baumeister  
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sought to demonstrate that making people disbelieve in free 
will acts as a nonconscious prime to act in relatively  
automatic ways, which includes acting upon more selfish 
impulses rather than exerting control and self-restraint.   
 In their 2009 study, Baumeister, Masicampo and 
DeWall used an improved methodology (most notably, 
improved prime passages describing free will or 
determinism) built upon Vohs and Schooler’s experiment 
and found that prosocial tendencies (as characterized by a 
willingness to help) were reduced among participants who 
were induced to believe in determinism and disbelieve in 
free will. That is, these participants were less willing to help 
across a wide array of situations and opportunities than were 
those in the control group (i.e., those who were induced to 
believe in free will). In follow-up experiments, they focused 
on self-control and found that a disbelief in free will makes 
people reluctant to expend their energy in acts of self-
restraint. Furthermore, since aggression is an automatic and 
antisocial response, they hypothesized that the deterministic 
beliefs are related to aggression by depleting the ability to 
override certain types of socially undesirable automatic 
impulses. Specifically, they found that those individuals who 
were chronically high in disbelief in free will were also less 
likely to help others in distress than those who were 
skeptical of rejecting free will.  
 The broader implications of these results suggest that 
volition and self-control require the person to expend 
energy, and that these expenditures enable them to act 
prosocially. Apparently, a disbelief in free will subtly 
reduces people’s ability to expend that energy, and the 
disbelief in free will serves as a cue to act on impulse, which 
generally promotes selfish actions such as aggressing and 
refusing to help. Baumeister et al. concede that these results  
  95 
 
have nothing to say about free will as objective reality; 
indeed, their results could hold valid even if free will is a  
complete illusion. The authors write, “Some philosophical 
analyses may conclude that a fatalistic determinism is 
compatible with highly ethical behavior, but the present 
results suggest that many laypersons do not yet appreciate 
that possibility” (Baumeister et al. 2009, 267).  
 Without explicit statement, both Vohs and Schooler 
and Baumeister et al. seem to be showing that people hold 
incompatibilist views regarding determinism and moral 
responsibility. More generally, they hold that a belief in free 
will, regardless of its ontological truth, is pertinent to 
prosocial behavior and morality. These experimenters 
sought to answer the question of whether the knowledge of 
determinism undermines a sense of moral agency, and they 
adhere to the conclusion that such reminders negatively 
affect our social interactions in highly unconscious, 
automatic ways. But there also exists a competing view that 
this feeling of being a morally free and responsible agent, 
illusory or not, has limits to the capacity by which it can be 
undermined. Daniel Wegner, a Harvard psychologist and 
author of The Illusion of Conscious Will, writes:  
I’m a case in point. I’ve devoted years of my 
life to the study of conscious will…If the 
illusion could be dispelled by explanation, I 
should be some kind of robot by now, a 
victim of my own nefarious schemes. No self, 
no magic, no inner agent. Yes, it’s true, when 
I’m on the dance floor I may look a bit 
robotic to some – but I’m happy to report that 
despite my personal flurry of illusion busting, 
I remain every bit as susceptible to the 
experience of conscious will as the next  
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person. It feels like I’m doing things (Wenger 
2008, 237). 
 
I must clarify that I do not doubt the view that knowledge 
can diminish our sense of moral responsibility and conscious 
control by varying degrees. A greater understanding of the 
biological bases of mental illness has indeed caused subtle 
changes to the ways in which we ascribe punishment to 
criminals whose actions were deemed beyond their control. 
But in the minute-to-minute everyday sense – somebody 
cuts me off while changing lanes on the highway, or misses 
a scheduled meeting and leaves me waiting – I argue that the 
ways in which we see both ourselves and others as moral 
agents cannot be undermined. A Humean approach 
appropriately illustrates the naturalist account for which I am 
arguing. 
 
III. Hume’s skepticism: the problem of induction and the 
problem of free will 
 Hume distinctively sought to ground human 
knowledge on empirical natural facts to develop a 
naturalized account of human cognition. Hume describes the 
problem of induction by the fact that experience does not 
produce the idea of an effect from an impression of its cause 
by reason, but rather by the imagination or certain 
association and relation of perceptions. The crux of the 
problem is that if understanding produced inductive 
conclusions, then inductive reason would be based on the 
assumption that nature is uniform, or that those instances 
that we have not experienced follow the experiences of the 
past. If this were the premise to be established by reasoning, 
then reasoning would be either deductive or probabilistic. 
Since the principle cannot be proven deductively, since  
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whatever is proven deductively is a necessary truth, and this 
principle isn’t necessary since its antecedent is consistent 
with the denial of its consequent. Causal or probabilistic  
reasoning also cannot prove it, because it is presupposed by 
all such reasoning.  
 In The Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 
Hume classifies all reason into either relation of ideas or 
matters of facts. Matters of fact are propositions whose 
negations do not necessarily lead to contradictions. Hume 
regards my assertion that the sun will not rise tomorrow no 
less intelligible, nor no more a contraction, than the assertion 
that it will. So all reasoning concerning matter of fact is 
founded on the relation between cause and effect; after 
repeated experiences of events of type A being followed by 
type B, we will be prone to infer event B following an 
experience of event A. There is no necessary connection 
between events A and B, and the post-hoc reasoning that B 
is followed by a fact A is a type of inductive reasoning. This 
causal chain of reasoning extends backward into the further 
past as we infer a posteriori. But we cannot establish a 
connection without having had an experience in which event 
A is followed by event B, so it logically follows that cause 
and effect cannot be reasoned for using a priori 
argumentation (Hume 1999).  
 This is the negative component of Hume’s argument, 
as he rules out accounts of induction that view it as the 
product of reason.  Causal reasoning is the strongest 
associative relation and perhaps also the most important, 
since by means of inferring this relation can we go beyond 
the evidence of our memory and senses. We may even say 
that we are, in a sense, “addicted” to inferring a connection 
between the present fact and that which is inferred from it. 
Causal reasoning is not a priori. We discover causes and  
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effects through experience, not by reason, and most ordinary 
causal judgments become so familiar over time that our 
judgments seems automatic.  
 The process that produces our causal expectations is 
itself causal; customs and habits determine the mind to 
assume that the future is congruent with the past insofar as it 
assumes like effects to follow from like causes. Hume does 
not go so far as saying that we are justified when we engage 
in inductive reasoning, yet also realizes that his negative 
phase exhausts all other forms of reasoning. We have no 
choice but to induce, and we have no choice but to expect 
laws of the past to hold similarly in the future. I have no 
logical reason to believe that the sun will rise tomorrow, but 
I just cannot help it. When I get out of bed in the morning, I 
have no reason to believe that the gravity of today is the 
same of the gravity of yesterday, and that I won’t fly toward 
the ceiling. When I open my mouth to speak, there is no 
guarantee that words will come forth. Yet without any of 
these inductive inferences, I could not exist. I could not 
convey ideas through language, and I could not move my 
body. Without inductive properties, it seems that human 
existence comes to a complete halt. 
 This skeptical approach parallels the problem of free 
will. Vohs and Schooler concluded that we must insulate the 
public from knowledge of determinism since it leads to an 
increase in morally wrong behaviors. But if Hume is right 
with regard to inductive inference, then we may view the 
undeniable feeling of being a free and morally responsible 
agent as an analogously similar and necessity facet of 
naturalized human cognition. If we imagine a world in 
which we believe ourselves to be completely constrained, 
and within a world in which we have no ability to do 
otherwise and all actions are determined by antecedent  
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causes, which are themselves determined by antecedent 
causes, so on and so forth, then even thinking about our own 
freedom, as we are presently doing, becomes exceedingly  
problematic. Our present thoughts are a determined act that 
none of us are deliberatively and consciously willing; we 
must not doubt that we are indeed reasoning at the present 
moment, but this reasoning is nonetheless derived from 
antecedent causes beyond our control. Conceiving this world 
feels beyond the capacities of human cognition, and 
navigating a world in which we come to truly internalize this 
sense of naturalistic determinism, although logically 
possible, appears far too abstract for the human mind. 
 By taking the Humean route, I argue that, in light of 
a strong scientific image, we indeed have reason to believe 
that actions have antecedent physical causes. These actions 
may not have one sufficient or necessary cause (i.e., 
monocausation must not necessarily hold true), but actions 
are nonetheless driven by complex sets of factors that 
necessarily guide the future in one direction. Hume argued 
that we have no justified reason to believe that the sun either 
will rise tomorrow; in parallel fashion, we have no reason to 
believe both ourselves and others are the originators of 
actions and should feel morally responsible as such. 
Inductive inference is central to the very reasoning that 
makes us human, and I argue that the feeling of being 
morally responsible, and the feeling that other people are 
morally responsible as well, is naturalistically grounded in a 
human necessity that can not be undermined by 
contradictory evidence.1  
                                                
1 As I stressed earlier, I do not doubt the degree to which ascribing 
responsibility to both ourselves and others can be diminished in varying 
degrees, unlike the absolute necessity of inductive inference. However, 
there exists a sincere limit to which a feeling of agency can be 
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IV. Are we intuitive compatibilists or incompatibilists?  
 The project of experimental philosophy is, in part, to 
explore the common intuitions of normal folk. This 
innovative movement seeks to return the discipline of 
philosophy to a focus on questions about how people 
actually think and feel; it departs from a long-standing 
tradition of armchair exploration as experimental 
philosophers go out and conduct systematic experiments to 
reach a better understanding of people's ordinary intuitions 
about philosophically significant questions. Experimental 
philosophers approach the question of free will by 
questioning how the paradox of responsibility arises and 
why it persists both among professional philosophers and 
the folk. If only accomplished philosophers had conflicting 
intuitions about the topic, then the paradox would not be so 
troubling or persistent in the progression of literature. And 
when experimental philosophers speak of intuition, they 
refer to inclinations to believe claims whose attractiveness is 
not dependent on any conscious inference. Common 
intuitions are not especially reflective, and these are the ones 
studied most by experimental philosophers.  
 Shaun Nichols, a leader in the field, explored the lay 
understanding of choice, and found that both children and 
adults tended to treat moral choices as indeterminist. Here, 
they were given cases of moral choice events (e.g., a girl 
steals a candy bar) and physical events (e.g., a pot of water 
comes to a boil) and asked whether, if everything in the 
world was the same right up until he event occurred, the 
event must occur. Both the children and the adults were 
more likely to answer yes in the case of the physical event  
                                                
undermined, and for this reason the analogy between induction and free 
will is highly appropriate, although not completely parallel. 
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than the moral event (Nichols 2004). Thus, these results 
seem to suggest that people believe that some cases of moral 
decisions are not determined. People intuitively believe that  
their actions are not governed by the same physical laws that 
govern inanimate objects. 
 A parallel agenda recently explored whether people 
are intuitive compatibilists or incompatibilists about moral 
responsibility. Woolfolk, Doris and Darley provided 
participants with a story about an individual who is 
kidnapped and given a “compliance drug” that makes it 
impossible for him to disobey orders. When the kidnappers 
order him to act immorally, he has no choice but to obey. 
Participants were either in the low identification condition 
and told that the agent did not want to perform the immoral 
act, or in the identification condition, and told that that he 
wanted to perform it all along. The results demonstrated a 
main effect of identification; those in the high identification 
condition attributed significantly higher ratings of 
responsibility to the agent that those in the low identification 
condition (Woolfolk et al. 2006). This is in line with 
Frankfurt’s compatibilist claim that responsibility depends 
on identification (Frankfurt 1969). 
 A further study by Nahmias, Morris, Nadelhoffer and 
Turner poses a more significant threat for the view that 
people are intuitive incompatibilists. They found that 
participants hold agents morally responsible even when that 
agent is acting in a completely deterministic universe. 
Participants read the following scenario 
Imagine that in the next century we discover 
all the laws of nature, and we build a 
supercomputer which can deduce from these 
laws of nature and from the current state of 
everything in the world exactly what will be  
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happening in the world at any future time. It 
can look at everything about the way the 
world is and predict everything about how it  
will be with 100% accuracy. Suppose that 
such a supercomputer existed, and it looks at 
the state of the universe at a certain time on 
March 25th, 2150 A.D., twenty years before 
Jeremy Hall is born. The computer then 
deduces from this information and the laws of 
nature that Jeremy will definitely rob Fidelity 
Bank at 6:00 pm on January 26th, 2195. As 
always, the supercomputer’s prediction is 
correct; Jeremy robs Fidelity Bank at 6:00 pm 
on January 26th, 2195. 
 
After reading the vignette, participants were immediately 
asked whether or not Jeremy is morally responsible for 
robbing the bank. Strikingly, 83% responded that he is 
blameworthy. This effect was replicated in two further 
experiments with different scenarios, providing strong 
evidence that people regard moral responsibility compatible 
with determinism (Nahmias et al 2005). 
 The results described above raise a significant 
dilemma: if people so consistently demonstrate compatibilist 
positions on experimental questionnaires, then for what 
reason does the debate over incompatibilism persist? 
Nichols and Knobe suspect that there is more at work here 
than has typically been acknowledged. In their view, most 
people have a logical bias toward incompatibilist theories of 
moral responsibility (at least in our culture), and these 
tendencies are easily elicited in philosophical discussion and 
especially within the classroom. However, in addition to 
these preferences, people also exhibit immediate affective  
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reactions to vignettes describing immoral behaviors. They 
write, “What we see in the results of Nahmias and 
colleagues is, in part, the effect of these affective reactions.  
To uncover people’s underlying theories, we need to offer 
them questions that call for more abstract, theoretical 
cognition” (Nichols and Knobe 2008, 109). 
 Nichols and Knobe wished to explore whether 
participants would be more likely to report compatibilist or 
incompatibilist intuitions if they controlled for emotional 
and motivational factors. Thus, they isolated two conditions: 
in the concrete condition, they aimed to elicit greater 
affective responses, whereas in the abstract condition, they 
aimed to trigger theoretical, armchair cognition. They 
hypothesized that people would be more likely to act as 
incompatibilists in the concrete (i.e., emotional) condition. 
 Participants were provided with descriptions of 
Universe A and Universe B; in Universe A, everything that 
happens is completely caused by whatever happened before 
it, and this is true from the very beginning of the universe up 
until the present. Universe B describes an environment in 
which almost everything is completely caused by whatever 
happened previously. Thus, the key difference between the 
two is that, given the past, whether or not each decision has 
to happen. Participants were asked which universe is most 
like their own, and to explain their answer. Over 90% 
reported to live in a universe most like Universe B, 
suggesting that people intuitively see their world as 
indeterministic.  
 As a follow-up, participants then answered a 
question regarding compatibilism. They were randomly 
assigned to either the concrete condition or the abstract 
condition. In the concrete condition, they read the following 
statement: 
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In Universe A, a man named Bill has become 
attracted to his secretary, and he decides that 
the only way to be with her is to kill his wife  
and three children. He knows that it is 
impossible to escape from his house in the 
even of a fire. Before he leaves on a business 
trip, he sets up a device in his basement that 
burns down the house and kills his family. Is 
Bill fully morally responsible for killing his 
wife and children? 
 
In this condition, 72% gave a compatibilist response, 
indicating that Bill should be held fully morally responsible. 
This is synonymous with the findings of Nahmias et al. 
2005). In the abstract condition, they were asked the 
following: In Universe A, is it possible for a person to be 
fully morally responsible for their actions? As hypothesized, 
an incredible 86% of participants gave the incompatibilist 
response. In short, these results indicate that affect interacts 
with judgments to elicit compatibilist intuition. 
 This experiment still leaves open questions about 
whether the responses are actually the product of emotion. It 
is conceivable that what mattered was the concreteness 
itself, not the actual affect associated with concreteness. 
That is, perhaps the compatibilist responses were elicited 
because the scenario described a particular act by a 
particular individual, and the results are not due to affect 
alone. To investigate this, Nichols and Knobe created a new 
moderator in which subjects were randomly assigned to 
either the high affect or the low affect condition. For high 
affect, they were asked: As he has done many times in the 
past, Bill stalks and rapes a stranger. Is it possible that Bill is 
fully morally responsible for raping the stranger? In the low  
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affect condition, they read: As he has done many times in 
the past, Mark arranges to cheat on his taxes. Is it possible 
that Mark is fully morally responsible for cheating on his  
taxes? For half of the subjects, the question stipulated that 
the agent was in Universe A; for the other half, it was in 
Universe B. Thus, they created a 2x2 factorial design of 
affect and universe. They found that even when concreteness 
was controlled for, affect impacts people’s intuitions about 
responsibility under deterministic circumstances (Nichols 
and Knobe 2008). The complete results were as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
Overall, we find that both affect and concreteness are 
important in the process that generates compatibilist 
judgments. Explanatory models exist for both of these 
criteria as independent identities, but as we will see in the 
coming section, they complement each other remarkably 
well as I come to argue for a naturalized account of treating 
both ourselves and others as morally free and responsible 
agents. 
 
 
 
 Agent in 
indeterminist 
universe 
Agent in 
determinist 
universe 
High 
affect 
case 
95% 64% 
Low 
affect 
case 
89% 23% 
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V. Explanatory models: Affect, social intuitionism, and 
concreteness 
 Within psychology, the field of social cognition has 
recently shifted focus from the deliberative aspects of 
decision making to the highly automatic and unconscious 
ones. More specifically, emotion research portrays automatic 
processes as heavily dependent upon affective states. The 
primary method with which psychologists test for 
nonconscious influences on cognition is called nonconscious 
priming. John Bargh and colleagues asked participants to 
complete a scrambled sentence task either loaded with terms 
associated with the elderly or neutral terms. Unbeknownst to 
the participants, researchers measured the speed with which 
they moved about the room, and found that those who were 
nonconsciously primed to think about the elderly actually 
walked slower than those in the control condition. They 
showed that even when a goal or concept is induced 
implicitly, an effect may still emerge. In a follow-up study, 
Bargh et al. provided participants with scrambled words 
either loaded with the concept of rudeness of politeness. 
They were instructed to notify the experimenter when they 
were ready to move to the next task; however, the 
experimenter was engaged in conversation and the 
participant would have to interrupt in order to give 
notification. The experimenters found that those in the 
rudeness condition interrupted significantly more than those 
in the other condition, remarkably demonstrating that our 
decisions are influenced in ways that fall far outside of 
awareness (Bargh et al. 1996). They write, “For every 
psychological effect (e.g., behavior, emotion, judgment, 
memory, perception), there exists a set of causes or 
antecedent conditions that uniquely lead to that effect” 
(Bargh and Ferguson 2000, 295).  
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 Social psychologist Jennifer Lerner has heavily 
influenced the literature on emotional cognition, and found 
that when subjects’ were primed to arouse negative 
emotions, they held agents more responsible and more 
deserving of punishment; indeed, this even held true when 
the negative emotions were aroused by an unrelated event 
(Lerner et al. 1998). In their experimental design, 
participants in an anger condition watched a violent film of a 
bully beating up a teenager, while subjects in the neutral-
control condition watched a video clip of abstract figures. 
All participants then attributed responsibility for various 
negligent behaviors to fictional characters. Interestingly, 
those in the anger condition gave higher responsibility 
ratings than subjects in the control condition. This provides 
significant evidence that emotions induced by outside events 
(i.e., the film) impact responsibility judgments in clearly 
unrelated scenarios. A natural interpretation of this data is 
that the emotion biased the participants in making their 
assessments of reasonability, and thus detracted from their 
abilities to reason in a more logical manner. 
 This literature built a remarkably strong foundation 
for the emerging field of moral psychology, which 
investigates the role of emotion, automatic judgments and 
other motivational factors in forming intuitions in ethically 
relevant situations. Social psychologist Jonathan Haidt has 
pioneered morality research with his social intuitionist 
model of moral judgments (Haidt 2001). His central claim 
states that moral judgment is caused by quick moral 
intuitions and is followed (when needed) by slow, ex post 
facto moral reasoning; this is not an anti-rationalist model, 
but rather alludes to the complex and dynamic ways by 
which intuition, social influences and reasoning interact to 
produce moral judgment.  
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 Haidt motivated his model with what he calls moral 
dumbfounding. When participants were presented with a 
story describing a brother and sister (Julie and Mark) who 
decide to make love but have safe sex and actually grow 
closer from the experience, most responded that they felt it 
was wrong but could not articulate why. Haidt explains that 
while moral emotions (e.g., sympathy, disgust) are 
sometimes significant inputs in the reasoning process, they 
are not the direct causes of moral judgments. Participants 
who read about Mark and Julie experienced a strong visceral 
response to the vignette, and felt a small flash of disapproval 
for the act before they were able to actually articulate why 
they felt this way. In line with the social intuitionist model, 
these individuals made quick, automatic moral intuitions as 
influenced by their affective states, and then attempted to 
follow these intuitions with deliberative reasoning as 
justification for their responses. At a certain point, they 
realized that their intuitions were logically irrational; when 
asked, after many times, why the act was wrong, they 
ultimately responded with, “I don’t know why, but it just is.”  
 Haidt’s social intuitionist model provides plausible 
explanation for the different intuitions generated in Nichols 
and Knobe’s high and low affect cases. But there remains 
the case of judgments made in concrete versus abstract 
situations, and Haidt’s research in emotion and moral 
intuition appropriately leads to this discussion. Concrete 
situations aptly describe cases occurring in our own worlds, 
with which we are highly familiar, and from which we can 
draw a great deal of experiential knowledge. Abstract 
conditions, however, concern a world with which we are far 
less familiar, and must draw upon logical a priori reasoning 
to form judgments. 
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 Concreteness and abstractness are clearly contrasted 
in the case of Nichols and Knobe’s Universe A and Universe 
B. Recall that the vast majority of participants deemed 
Universe B most like our own; thus, when answering 
questions about Universe B, they drew upon concrete 
notions of everyday experience to form intuitions. Universe 
A, however, is slightly ambiguous since participants did not 
believe themselves to have first-hand knowledge of and 
experience with a world in which human decisions are 
completely governed and determined by the same physical 
laws that govern inanimate objects. Do the participants have 
family in this alternate universe? What are the 
environmental influences on action? Is there law 
enforcement? In this respect, Universe A is far less concrete. 
The majority of people believed themselves to be familiar 
with Universe B, and hence formed a vast array of beliefs, 
images and other cognitive attitudes about this world. These 
complex sets of formations draw upon affective responses, 
and form distinctive cognitive attitudes about the world. We 
may conclude from this discussion that concreteness tends to 
stimulate compatibilist intuitions and abstractness tends to 
stimulate incompatibilist intuitions.  
 There is markedly distinctive manner by which 
people form intuitions as they move from the philosopher’s 
armchair or an academic classroom and into the concrete 
nature of real world social interactions. Haidt’s social 
intuitionist model of moral judgment motivates this 
assertion, as concrete situations draw upon dynamic sets of 
experience and knowledge; since an astonishing proportion 
of our memories and values are stored as involving strong 
emotional components, concrete situations elicit the 
automatic and unconscious intuitions for which the model 
argues. Abstract cases, on the other hand, elicit a separate  
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type of intuition. The professional philosopher, or simply the 
law person who is asked to reason for an abstract case about 
some alternate universe, allows for more of the post hoc 
reasoning that Haidt includes in his model. Since moral 
intuitions are, under many circumstances, tiny flashes of 
either approval or disapproval, there are strong evolutionary 
reasons for the persistence of intuitive judgments in highly 
concrete cases. The disgust emotion, for example, originated 
as an oral defensive mechanism against noxious stimuli and 
parasitic substances, yet has transitioned far from its 
evolutionarily intended purpose and into the moral domain. 
Inbar, Pizarro, Knobe and Bloom found that an individual 
sensitivity to physical elicitors of disgust predicts an 
intuitive disapproval of homosexual behavior, which is 
potentially regarded as a type of sexual impurity (Inbar et al. 
2009). The disgust response has a strong evolutionary value, 
yet causes an over-generalized response in some present 
moment social situations. But people are nonetheless able to 
override implicit judgments of this sort and rely upon post 
hoc deliberation to form an explicit preference. Applied to 
the discussion of concrete and abstract situations, we know 
that people are less able to regulate their cognitive processes, 
and instead fall back on more automatic judgments, when 
under strong emotional influence. Concrete situations elicit 
strong, often visceral, emotional states that cause people to 
rely on certain automatic intuitions that do not necessarily 
coincide with the intuitions they would form if they had 
ample time and cognitive resources to devote for full 
deliberative reasoning.  
 In this section, I examined the cognitive effects of 
affect and concreteness on intuition. High affect and 
concrete situations elicit compatibilist intuitions more than 
low affect abstract situations. This is demonstrated by  
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experimental philosophers, and is motivated by Haidt’s 
social intuitionist model.  
 
V. Conclusion 
 This paper addresses the problem of free will from a 
psychological perspective. I asked whether knowledge of 
determinism undermines the feeling of being a morally 
responsible agent. Vohs and Schooler used experimental 
investigation to find that people primed to believe in a 
naturalistically determined universe acted more immorally 
than those in a control condition. If their conclusion is 
correct, then it seems as if we have reason to worry. 
However, I argue here for a naturalized account of referring 
to both ourselves and others as morally free and responsible 
agents. I draw the analogy to Hume’s skeptical account of 
the problem of induction; this feeling of moral agency is 
fundamental to and extricable from human cognition, much 
in the same way that inductive inference presupposes human 
thought and interaction. The problem of free will is perhaps 
so troubling because conflicting intuitions regarding the 
compatibility or incompatibility of moral responsibility are 
widespread and persistent among both the philosopher and 
lay folk. Experimental philosophers have devoted empirical 
investigation to the issue at hand by uncovering intuitions of 
compatibilism or incompatibilism and varying affective 
elicitors and the concreteness of target situations. These 
factors accurately account for conflicting intuitions, as 
demonstrated by Haidt’s social intuitionist model of moral 
judgment. When our intuitions refer to high affect and 
concrete cases, we fall back on automatic intuitions in favor 
of compatibilist judgments. As we leave the armchair and 
venture into the complex social dynamic of real-world 
situations, these intuitions are fundamental to human  
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cognition. This is a naturalized account of moral agency, for 
we see that knowledge of naturalism or determinism does 
not readily undermine the way we treat both ourselves and 
others as morally free and responsible agents. Even in a 
world believed to be naturally determined, we see moral 
action as unrestrained by the physical laws that govern 
inanimate objects. Ontological dispute surrounds the first-
order truth or free will or determinism, but the psychological 
truth of feeling morally free is an undeniable reality.  
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